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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to identify the common
elements of success in downtown retail development projects,
in which the public sector participated. By analyzing 5 case
studies of successful public-private retail development
projects, common elements were identified that can provide
guidance for public sector actors in pursuing downtown retail
development. In order to determine the elements, each case
was analyzed in terms of; the motivation of the city to pursue
such development; how the city organized to deal with the
project; who were the major actors in the project and what
role did they play; what was the final deal that the city was
able to negotiate and finally; what were the most critical
things the city did to help the project succeed. From this
framework and the common elements that were identified through
it, a set of recommendations were formulated for the Mayor of
Denver, to guide his decision-making in determining a role for
the city in the Centerstone retail project in downtown Denver,
Colorado.
Thesis Supervisor: Bernard J. Frieden
Title: Professor of City Planning
Joint Thesis Supervisor: Lynne B. Sagalyn
Title: Assistant Professor of Planning
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INTRODUCTION:
Throughout history shopping has been a major ingredient
of downtown life. Some would argue that it is the most signifi-
cant ingredient of a lively, diverse and healthy downtown.
The more varied and exciting the downtown shopping experience,
the more attractive downtown is to shoppers and in turn,
investors. Shopping generally supports other activities --
entertainment, housing, offices and institutions -- and is in
turn supported by them. One indicator of the importance of
shopping to downtowns is the impact of retail decline on the
image and economic health of downtown. Many cities have
recognized the value for a strong retail component to their
downtowns and have made creative efforts to strengthen it.
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the role of
the city, i.e., the public sector, in the development of a
major downtown retail project. While there are many issues
surrounding the involvement of the public sector in real
estate development, this thesis will focus on identifying the
key principles of successful downtown public/private ventures
in other cities and the application of those principles.
This thesis will not concern itself with the creation
of a financial model for cities to utilize in evaluating
projects. Nor will it deal with detailed flow charts of
administrative roles and relationships.
The approach this thesis will take will be to analyze
five successful downtown retail projects and determine the
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common elements that contributed to their successful
implementation. The information for analyzing the five
projects will come from a series of case studies of downtown
development directed by MIT professors Bernard J. Frieden and
Lynne B. Sagalyn. From the common elements, the goal is to
derive some guiding principles or lessons that can be applied
to the Denver Centerstone Retail project in downtown Denver,
Colorado. The result of the thesis will be a series of
recommendations that could be utilized by the Mayor in
evaluating the public's role in the project.
There are many factors that must come together in order
for a project of this nature to be successful. Chapter 1 will
present an overview of successful projects in other cities and
identify the key elements that contributed to their success.
There will also be a discussion of the various techniques
utilized. A primary hypothesis that the author will put forth
in this thesis will concern the role of leadership, public or
private, in a successful project. It is the author's belief
that public or private leadership is the most critical factor
in a public/private real estate venture of this nature.
Chapter 2 will provide a brief background of the down-
town Denver retail project known as Centerstone. The chapter
will focus on an analysis of the project in terms of the
framework utilized in the analysis of the cases in Chapter 1.
Chapter 3 will outline recommendations for the Mayor to
consider in evaluating what the city's role should be in this
5
project. There will be discussion concerning political
strategies, techniques for organizing to handle this project
and roles of other actors in the project.
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CHAPTER 1 OVERVIEW OF SUCCESS: THE KEY ELEMENTS
Introduction
Public/private partnerships in downtown revitalization
have evolved significantly from the days of Urban Renewal.
Gone are the days of flowing federal funds. Cities have
become and will need to continue to become more independent of
"free" or nearly free of federal money.
The new techniques require a much more creative and
entrepreneurial approach by the public sector in dealing with
private sector partners. However, the techniques are only one
part of the success of these projects.
This chapter reviews 5 public/private downtown develop-
ment partnerships and attempts to identify the common key
elements that contributed to their success. In order to
analyze the case studies, a framework of 5 factors were
evaluated.
1) Motivation/rationale for involvement: Why did the city
become involved in the project? How did they justify
to the public the need to participate in the project?
2) Organizational Aspects: How did the city organize to
deal with the project? Did the city do anything extra-
ordinary in order to handle this project? What was the
general philosophy about negotiation and any subsequent
renegotiation? Did the city understand the nature of
the development process? How did the city prepare to
negotiate with the developer?
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3) Actors/Roles: Who were the major actors? Public
sector personalities/groups and/or private sector
personalities/groups? What role did the business
community play? Did the public sector play a primary
role in initiating and supporting the project, or did
the business community? Were there any key leaders?
if so, what in particular did they do?
4) The Deal: What did the city put into the project in
terms of dollars and what did they get in return? What
other assistance did the city provide in the project
and what was the nature of that assistance? Did the
city utilize any special financial tools? What were
the cities objectives?
5) Critical Factors: What were the most critical things
the city did without which the project would not have
succeeded?
After reviewing the case studies based on these
factors, the chapter will draw conclusions as to what some of
the key principles are that a city should follow when entering
into a public/private development project.
The projects and cities that will be reviewed include:
Horton Plaza, San Diego, California; Plaza Pasadena, Pasadena,
California; Faneuil Hall Marketplace, Boston, Massachusetts;
Pike Place Market, Seattle, Washington; and Town Square, St.
Paul, Minnesota.
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PLAZA PASADENA
This regional mall is located in downtown Pasadena and
consists of 585,000 sq. ft. on two levels. The project was
part of an overall redevelopment effort being pursued by the
city. The total cost of the project was $107.6 million
dollars, inclusive of all site acquisition, demolition and
improvements, construction costs, tenant improvements and
parking (ULI, 1983). The project went through 8 years of
planning, negotiation and construction before it opened to the
public.
Motivation/rationale for involvement
The center city of Pasadena was in a serious state of
decline characterized by a prevalence of obsolete buildings,
instability of business activities, a shrinking regional
market area, growing competition within the marketing area,
deterioration of many buildings, and street and parking
problems. In response to the problems and the accompanying
prospect of a declining tax base, loss of jobs and social
problems, the city created a 340-acre redevelopment area. A
key element of the plan called for a regional retail center.
The city wanted to keep the middle income families that were
fleeing the city. By providing a moderately priced retail
center as part of a revived downtown, the city felt they could
overcome their bad image as well as boost lagging tax
revenues.
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Organizational Aspects
The city utilized its existing redevelopment agency as
the primary entity to handle the project. The executive
director, who had been newly hired just before this project,
had extensive experience in redevelopment in Los Angeles. The
city did change the name of the agency, to the Pasadena
Redevelopment Authority (PRA), in an attempt to improve its
image.
Under California law, a redevelopment agency is respons-
ible for the elimination of blight through the redevelopment
process. The agency has the power to: 1) acquire land,
including the use of eminent domain 2) assemble land
3) develop, administer, sell or lease property 4) demolish
deteriorated structures 5) relocate residents and businesses
6) provide on and off-site improvements 7) issue bonds and
expend their proceeds.
For this project the PRA utilized consultants extens-
ively to assist them in preparing for negotiations with the
developer. In order to be as prepared as possible, the city
utilized consultants familiar with shopping centers. Some of
the studies they had prepared to provide a basis for negotiation
included:
1) Feasibility analysis (economic consultant)
2) Preliminary design studies (architectural consultant)
3) Property values (appraisal firm)
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4) Preliminary economic and planning studies including
proforma analysis, in order to estimate the neces-
sary public subsidy for the project (economic
consultant)
5) Market analysis
6) Development opportunity analysis (value of oppor-
tunity)
Consultants were utilized throughout the negotiation process
so that proposals could be evaluated and submitted that best
represented the city's interest in getting the project done.
In an effort to insure the success of the project, the
executive director of the PRA wanted a specific experienced
retail developer, who he was eventually able to get.
The cities commitment to the project, as well as the
developers, was illustrated by the number of times that the
DDA (Disposition and Development Agreement) was renegotiated.
Neither party appeared to be averse to renegotiating the
terms of the agreement. The city was firm on certain items of
negotiation, the primary one dealing with design considera-
tions.
Actors/Roles
Both the city and business community played significant
roles in this project.
The business community early in the planning process
for the entire redevelopment area paid for and heavily
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influenced a major study of downtown. The study was called
the Central District Improvement Program. According to one
downtown businessman, "the consultants did not put anything in
the report they were not told to." Perhaps of more signifi-
cance, however, was the fact that the business community held
a majority on the City Board of Directors. Through this
majority they were able to control the appointment of a
majority of the members of the planning commission and the
redevelopment agency, as well as the city manager and his key
assistants. These roles, coupled with strong business
community support for the Plaza Pasadena project, proved to be
critical to the strategy of the key city actor in the project.
The support for the project by the City Board of Directors was
seriously tested by opponents who wanted the general public to
vote on the financing method for the project. Rather than
allow a test of public support for the project, the Board
changed the method (at the suggestion of the key city actor
and his board -- the Redevelopment Authority) to one which
would not require a citizen vote. This was a significant
move on their part affirming their commitment to the project.
It was also significant because of the manner in which the
citizen concerns were handled. Rather than trying to work
with the opponents of the project to create a compromise, the
city chose to remove the financing method decision from the
citizens. In a climate of greater opposition, this move might
have resulted in major problems for the project and those
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behind it. As it turned out, the opposition was not strong
enough to focus more citizen efforts to stop the project.
Another issue raised by this incident is the role of the
public in making decisions about how the city conducts its
business. In this project, the key city actor felt that there
were decisions that were required to be made by public
officials without citizen input. It was his feeling that it
was the responsibility of the public officials to be making
decisions on behalf of the public, and to include the
citizenry in certain decision-making processes, such as
financial packaging and even design issues, would only hinder
the project and potentially increase costs to a point where
the project would no longer be feasible. He felt that in
order for the city to make a project like Plaza Pasadena
successful, it must operate with almost as much flexibility as
the developer.
The key city actor was the executive director of the
PRA. A true political entrepreneur, he was able to utilize
expert political manuevers to avoid and deal with opposition
from the general public as well as from PRA and City Board
members. His strategy was to maintain a low profile, proceed
with minimum public notice and discussion (especially of
details) and to push for signed agreements early in the
process. Another element of his strategy was to have the city
deal with public approvals for the project. This insulated
the developer from political and public objections while
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allowing the PRA to manage and control them. The executive
director was also primarily responsible for the selection of
the developer of the project. When the director initially
came to the PRA, discussions had already been initiated with a
developer. The director wanted a developer with more retail
experience so he ended negotiations with the current developer
and began new negotiations with a developer he felt more
appropriate for the project. This new developer ultimately
became the developer of the project.
The Deal
The formal agreement between the city and the developer
was renegotiated several times, but for good reasons. The
primary reasons were related to the city's method of financing
its role in the project. The fact that both parties were
willing to renegotiate when certain circumstances changed the
ability of one of the parties to fulfill their obligations,
indicated a strong commitment to the project by both parties.
There were three major agreements signed by the parties
involved in the project, a Disposition and Development
Agreement (DDA), a Reciprocal Easement Agreement (REA), and a
Parking Facilities Lease. All three agreements required
extensive negotiation by all the parties involved. The DDA
detailed the rights and responsibilities of the developer and
the PRA. The REA is an agreement between the developer,
anchor tenants and the PRA covering responsibilities in areas
such as building design, construction schedules and common
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area management. The Parking Facilities Lease detailed the
roles and responsibil-ities of the City, the PRA, and the
developer in paying for the operations of the parking garages.
For the purposes of this thesis, the focus will be on
the DDA.
The PRA's obligation under the DDA were:
. purchase all the necessary land
. relocate businesses and individuals
. demolish all structures and remove debris
. construct 3 parking garages
. undertake all public improvements
. sell the air rights parcel over the underground
garage to the developer
. prepare and process an Environmental Impact Review
. bear the cost of defense of agency and developer
against any action brought by a third party
The public and private costs for the project were:
Private funds: $52,113,000
Public funds: (net) 41,009,000
Sources: public funds (gross)
Tax allocation bonds: 39,567,000
Investment Interest during construction: 1,442,000
Development payments and other funds: 1,262,000
The return to the city for its investment was:
. a 35 million dollar increase in sales tax
. an increase in permanent employment for 1800 people
. image enhancement
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. additional spinoff development
The philosophy of the PRA executive director was "while office
buildings will produce great amounts of tax increments -- thus a
good return on public investment -- they will not create the
necessary activitiy and vitality for a viable downtown. Hotels,
restaurants and retail businesses are what is needed. However,
their return on public investment will probably be a one-to-one
ratio rather than a fifteen-to-one ratio for office uses."
Critical Factors
The likelihood of this project succeeding would have been
significantly decreased had the business community, through its
representation on the key boards of the city, not remained so
committed to the project through the periods of public opposi-
tion. This commitment was also apparent in their obvious
support for required flexibility in renegotiating the agreements
in order to keep the project viable. Through this commitment,
in the face of public opposition, the members of the PRA Board
and the City Board of Directors were not only willing to risk
their political status in the community, but they were also
willing to put the city at risk in fulfilling their role in
the project. The committment illustrated that the willingness
to renegotiate was due partially to the desire to get the
project completed, and partially to the level of investment
the city already had in the project. The city did not want to
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lose the investment in time and money that they had placed in
the project, nor did the developer. This mutual investment
helped to maintain the willingness to renegotiate in order to
keep the project feasible. For the developer there was also
an investment in his reputation. Having been successful at
developing many suburban malls throughout California and the
U.S., he was interested in keeping his record intact. This
type of urban mall was also a new concept in retailing, and he
wanted to be as successful in developing urban malls as he was
in suburban malls.
Another critical factor was the city's ability to select
the developer for the project. Because the city controlled
the land and had specific objectives for its development, they
were able to select a developer to meet their needs. By
selecting a developer with the appropriate downtown retail
experience that the city needed and wanted, the likelihood of
the project becoming a success was greatly enhanced. Another
critical factor was the political entrepreneurship of the
executive director of the PRA. His ability to work around and
most often avoid the political and public opposition greatly
aided this project. Some of the tactics he utilized were not
desirable from a public/citizen viewpoint, although his goals
were clearly in pursuing the public's interest in the project.
There were certain elements of the project that he felt were
appropriate for the public to participate in and there were
others he felt were inappropriate. It appeared, however, that
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he stretched this belief even to the different boards he had
to deal with. When holding required public hearings on the
project, he would reveal as few details as possible often
dismissing questions about them as premature. When asked
about them at a subsequent meeting, he was known to reply that
the issue/detail had already been decided and it's too late to
provide input. What is critically important about this
example is the executive directors strategic timing with
regard to public hearings. He could legitimately "avoid" or
dismiss a question/issue on the grounds that it was "not
germane or appropriate" at that time. Some of the excuses he
used were, that "it was being addressed in the Environmental
Impact Report", or that the question was one of detailed design
and it was too early in the design process to address, etc.
The majority of the members of his Boards however, were not
disturbed by these tactics. They wanted to get the project
completed and the executive director was doing it. These
skills at manipulating the public process and keeping
(legitimately perhaps) detailed questions out of the general
public's eye were successful because of the political support
he had. In a different political climate, one requiring more
extensive public participation in the process, his "skills"
may have seriously hindered the project.
Another factor that helped the city in this project was
their use of consultants. The city did not try to enter into
the project without the necessary information to use as a
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basis for negotiations. The city recognized they did not have
staff to do the necessary work so they hired consultants. The
key in hiring the consultants is that the city knew what it
didn't know. In order to solve this problem, the city hired
specific consultants to provide specific services to aid them
in their negotiations. They also hired consultants who,
because of their experience working with both the private
and public sectors, were able to understand the city's role
and perspectives. This combined experience made the
consultants valuable third party players who significantly
shaped negotiations because they were credible analysts.
TOWN SQUARE
This mixed use project is located in downtown St. Paul,
Minnesota. The project consists of office, hotel, retail,
restaurants and public parking. The total cost of the project
was $126.6 million. The project went through ten years of
planning, negotiation and construction before it opened in 1980.
Motivation/rationale for involvement
Originally the site was part of an Urban Renewal
project area. As time went on, however, the downtown
continued to decline and the site remained undeveloped.
Locally the site beacome known as "Superhole", and had become
a symbol of the retail heart of St. Paul. The renewal program
that the site was a part of was blamed for the major losses in
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downtown retail (a net drop from 411 to 161 stores including
the loss of 361 stores in 12 years).
The city was embarrassed and concerned, not just
because of retail decline and all its associated impacts, but
because the Superhole was representative of the city's ability
to do something about its problems.
Organizational Aspects
When the project was initiated it was being handled
through the St. Paul Housing and Redevelopment Agency (HRA).
However, a newly elected Mayor decided to reorganize the
city's planning and development structure so that the city
could more actively participate in the development process.
In order to accomplish this, a Department of Planning and
Economic Development (PED) was etablished under the direction
of the mayor. This new department consolidated the functions
of the HRA, the Planning Department and the Community
Development office. The functions of the Board of the HRA
were transferred to the City Council. The HRA/PED had the
traditional powers of a renewal authority including: 1) the
use of eminent domain if necessary to acquire property,
2) the ability to sell, lease, develop or administer property,
3) the provision of on and offsite improvements.
Prior to the consolidation the HRA had designated
developers for the project without the use of financial
consultants, as was done in Plaza Pasadena. In the Plaza
Pasadena case, the city used financial consultants to provide
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the city with an analysis of the developers proposals. The
HRA did not consider the financial feasibility of the
proposals in their analysis. The HRA had developed detailed
design studies and proposals for the site however. One of the
major tools that the city used was the creation of a 33-block
Downtown Development District. Based on this district, the
city issued tax increment bonds to finance planning and design
studies for several projects within the district.
The city was flexible in its willingness to renegotiate
with the developer when it was necessary. For example, with
the support of the business community, extensions were granted
to the developers many times when they had difficulty securing
their financing. The city, when negotiating with the
developers, utilized staff rather than consultants to provide
backup information and analysis. All deals between the city
and the developer had to ultimately be approved by the
Council.
Actors/Roles
Throughout this project there was continual interaction
between the public and private sector to insure the success of
the project. The planning for the project began with brain-
storming sessions by public sector planners and the business
community. The business community paid for a study of down-
town development possibilities that was used as a basis for
future downtown development projects.
A joint committee was created that included public and
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private members, for the general purpose of building support
for increased retail development in downtown. The public and
private sector also worked together to develop strategies,
plans and presentations to build local support for the Town
Square project area. The city staff prepared design proposals
to illustrate the potential for the site. The crucial element
of the plan entitled the closing of a street and the creation
of a pedestrian area in its place. The City Council agreed to
support a crucial element of the plan if the business
community would find a developer for the site. The crucial
element of the plan entailed the closing of a street and the
creation of a pedestrian area in its place. The city staff
then prepared a presentation package to be used when meeting
with potential developers. The business community then
contacted and arranged meetings with select developers to
discuss the project. Through this cooperative process, the
two ultimate developers of the site were found, one for the
hotel and one for the office/retail portion.
Throughout the process, the business community provided
support. When the city needed to grant extensions to the
developers, there was business community support. There was
also press support for the project through their publicity
of the project which did not include significant serious
questions. Later in the process the business community helped
to find potential office and retail tenants when leasing was
not progressing well. A major downtown bank even went so far
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as to lease space in the project, even though it did not
need it, in order to help make the project successful. In
order to improve the feasibility of the hotel portion of the
project, a group of local investors pooled funds to invest in
the project. Members of the business community even worked to
settle disputes among themselves and the city concerning
operating support for the project, ultimately committing
themseleves to help fund operating costs of the public
portions. This was not an easy issue to resolve however.
There were very active factions within the business community
that did not want to pay any portion of the operating cost of
the enclosed public space within the project. The area that
was enclosed was essentially the public street that had been
closed for the project. The enclosed area included several
levels of public circulation space as well as a public park.
Eventually, through the Chamber of Commerce, with assistance
from the Mayor, the dissenting factions of the business
community reached a compromise formula to assess the costs for
operating and maintaining the public space more equitably.
The process was not always so smooth however. There
came a point when the project was not progressing and the
business community was beginning to feel alienated. To
further compound problems, there were negotiations in an
adjacent town concerning the development of a new major retail
center that would compete for one of the same anchor
department stores as well as some of the same tenants as the
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downtown location.
It was about this time that a new mayor was elected,
who had not received the support of the downtown business
community. The new mayor however, recognized a need for
public involvement in downtown as well as the problems
plaguing the Town Square project. The new mayor proved early
on that he was committed to the city and getting downtown
projects built -- without political revenge. One of the first
things the new mayor did was to establish the Department of
Planning and Economic Development (PED) and hire a competent
experienced director with no local political ties.
The new mayor was able to establish himself as a
professional and trustworthy political leader. He began by
meeting with key downtown business leaders one-on-one to get
their ideas on what had to be done to get the project and
downtown on the right track. He met with the key actors in
the development of the project to get their input and to
reaffirm the city's commitment to the project, and to confirm
that the city would continue to stick to all previous
agreements.
The mayor continued to use key personal meetings at
critical points in the process. There were times later in the
process that the mayor, with help from the business community,
was instrumental in mediating disputes within that community.
The mayor was also able to work with the help and support of
the city council. This was aided by the fact that the city
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was also doing projects in the neighborhoods -- not just
downtown. The mayor was able to gain financial support for
the project from a public entity that was prohibited by law
from participating in this type of project. They were able to
find a creative way to participate without breaking the law.
The mayor and the business community also met with the
Presidents of the primary retailers to emphasize their
commitment. The energy and commitment exhibited by the mayor
was cited as a primary factor in the decision process of the
retailers that located in the project.
Another primary public sector actor was the new
Director of PED. He moved quickly to gain control of the
process and to complete the negotiations. The project gained
momentum under the reaffirmation of the city's financial
commitments even though the city was not sure how it was going
to fulfill them. Utilizing his skills as an entrepreneur, the
Director was able to eventually put together a package of
financial resources from several diverse sources that would
fulfill the city's obligations. Another factor that
compounded the city's risk in this project was the city's
flexibility in working to accommodate construction schedules
through a fast-track construction process.
Because there were different developers, thus different
architects and contractors, the city made special efforts to
avoid more confusion by hiring the same consultants for their
portions of the project where appropriate.
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The city did not appear to have an organized strategy
for dealing with the project and the negotiations, just an
intense desire to get the project done. Although the city did
do numerous planning and design studies, there were no studies
of financial feasibility, value of the development opportun-
ity, retail development strategy or the needed public subsidy.
Despite this apparent lack of focused strategy, this complex
project was implemented successfully.
The Deal
The total cost of the Town Square project was
approximately $126.6 million. The public share, approximately
$22.3 million, 18 percent.
The public sector responsibilities included:
1) land acquisition
2) relocation and demolition
3) utility relocations
4) street and sidewalk improvements
5) development of enclosed public spaces including an
enclosed public park, skyway bridges and concourses
6) development of underground parking garages.
A portion of the city's cost was provided by a $4.8
million Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG). The underground
parking garage was financed using revenue bonds, which was
later purchased by one of the developers. Tax increment financ-
ing was also utilized through the Downtown Development
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District and the renewal authority. Additional federal grants
were recieved from the Community Development Block Grant pro-
gram (CDBG) and urban renewal.
The major goals that the city hoped to achieve
through this project were:
1) to revitalize the deteriorating central business
district
2) to recapture taxable property
3) to provide a competitive retail and employment
center
4) to reduce population out-migration
The financial returns that the city was seeking were in
the form of economic development. The projections included an
increase in property taxes estimated to be more than $2
million per year (to be used to retire tax increment bonds),
an increase in sales taxes from $600,000 to $1,200,000 per
year, and $15 million to $30 million of new retail sales per
year within three years of project completion. In addition,
it was estimated that 430 construction jobs would be created
for two years and that 2,873 new permanent jobs would result
from the project.
Additional payoffs included image enhancement and
spinoff development.
Critical Factors
Certainly a critical factor in the success of this
project was the role of the newly elected mayor. Under his
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direction the city was reorganized to more effectively deal
with development. He worked to cultivate, nurture and focus a
relationship with the private sector to benefit the project as
well as downtown. He was instrumental in getting public
entities to work creatively to find solutions to complex
financing problems. He was also apparently very adept at
getting support from council on the many complex elements of
the project. This project would never have been successful
had the Mayor not focused the amount of energy on it that he
did. It was apparent that the completion of this project was
one of the Mayor's highest priorities. The Mayor was pushing
the resources of the city in order to prove that the city
could get the "superhole" filled in with a project that would
help downtown.
As was illustrated by lack of emphasis on financial
analysis, the city was not compulsively interested in the
direct and immediate financial returns it would receive for
providing necessary financial resources for the project.
Financial assistance was only one way in which the city
mobilized support for the project. The Mayor was able to
rally the business community to provide assistance to the
project as well. The business community was as interested in
getting the project as the city was. The downtown was facing
competition from outlying communities for new retail
development. The Mayor, through his influence on the regional
review agency was able to discourage the development of a new
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regional mall on the outskirts of the city. The business
community worked to do what they could to help make the
project feasible.
Another key actor in this process was the Director of
PED. His ability to work behind the scenes to secure much
needed financing for the project was essential. Perhaps more
essential to the project was his willingness to put the city
at great risk in order to keep the project going. There were
times in the process that the city had committed to certain
elements of the project without any idea of where they were
going to get the funds to pay for it. They had confidence
that they would somehow find a way to fund the commitment and
they usually did. The point is that the city, mostly through
the PED Director, was going to do as much as they could to get
the project built and they weren't going to delay it in order
to give themselves time to figure out how to finance their
portion. They always knew they had fallback positions in case
a better method couldn't be found.
The flexibility and ability to work with the developers
to solve crisis after crisis is another factor that helped
keep the project going. the city was willing to continue to
renegotiate because they had a significant investment in the
project. The investment had more to do with their image than
with their finances.
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HORTON PLAZA
Located in downtown San Diego, Horton Plaza represents
a new approach to shopping center design. The architect of
the project likens it to an Italian Hill town. When completed
in August 1985 the first phase of the project will contain
850,000 square feet of retail on three levels. The project is
considered a combination regional mall and festival shopping
center. Other uses include a 450-room hotel, two theatres, a
cinema, restaurants, a day care center, an athletic club and a
marketplace/bazaar. The project will also include a 2,800 car
parking garage. Phase II will include the construction of
300,000 square feet of office or residential space. When
completed, the private investment will be approximately $140
million and the public investment approximately $33 million.
The project has taken approximately 10 1/2 years from the time
the city designated the site a redevelopment project, to its
completion in August 1985.
Motivation/Rationale for Involvement
Although the city of San Diego had experienced tremen-
dous growth between 1950 and 1980 when the population more
than doubled, the downtown area suffered from dilapidated
buildings, undesirable uses, and declining land values. This
decay was a direct result of major department stores and other
businesses moving from downtown to the suburbs where the high
growth was taking place. The businesses, primarily porno
shops, bars and sailer oriented stores, that replaced the
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fleeing merchants created problems in efforts to attract
investors, lenders and new retailers back into downtown.
Horton Plaza was seen as a major catalyst in revitalizing a
significant portion of downtown.
Organizational Aspects
The project was originally being managed through a
bureaucratric, time-consuming process involving many agencies.
In an attempt to improve the ability of the city to get the
project constructed, as well as to improve the capacity of the
city to quickly and efficiently facilitate the redevelopment
of downtown, a separate autonomous non-profit corporation was
created. With the approval of city council, the Redevelopment
Agency created the Centre City Development Corporation (CCDC)
to plan, direct, and implement redevelopment of the urban
core. Instead of dealing with the many city departments with
authority over the project, the developer was able to work
with just one agency.
The specific duties of the CCDC for Horton Plaza
included:
1) studying the impact of the project and
commissioning the preparation of an
environmental impact report.
2) overseeing the site acquisition,
relocation and clearance options.
3) coordinating the approval process
with other city agencies, the mayor
and city council.
4) arranging for financing the whole
redevelopment process through bond sales.
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5) entering into a disposition and
development agreement with the
developer.
6) monitoring the developer's working
drawings.
7) planning and implementing other
redevelopment projects adjacent to
the Horton site.
The CCDC and its role in this process did not become
fully implemented until the new executive director was hired.
The person hired was the same person that was responsible for
the Plaza Pasadena project. Coincidentally, the developer was
the same also. The fact that the developer and the executive
director had worked together successfully before greatly aided
this project.
To provide the necessary backup information for
negotiations, consultants were used extensively.
Both the city and the developer proved their committ-
ment to the project through the number of times they
renegotiated agreements rather than "walk away." Although the
first disposition and development agreement took two years of
negotiation to sign, it has since been revised or amended 13
times. The deal had to be renegotiated several times when
circumstances changed that affected the ability of the city or
the developer to abide by the terms of the agreement. The
staff of CCDC also had to negotiate with city council and
various groups opposed to the project in an attempt to
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convince them of the benefits of the project to the city.
These efforts became even more critical when the council had
to approve new or amended agreements. At one point in the
project the "whole business deal had to be turned upside down
and backwards to find a way to make it work".
Actors/Roles
There were four primary actors involved in this
project: the city council, the mayor, the executive director
of CCDC and the business community.
The business community's primary role was in providing
strong support for the project through its long evolution.
Perhaps the most significant contribution by the business
community was a workshop it sponsored on downtown development
to explore techniques of development from other cities. As a
result of the workshop, the business community put forth a
proposal to create a non-profit, autonomous, downtown develop-
ment corporation, that would allow the private sector to
become more involved in downtown development and would create
a much more efficient process for handling downtown
development. The city council and the mayor agreed that an
autonomous public authority would facilitate the development
of Horton Plaza as well as downtown. Based on the business
community support, the city council approved the creation of
the Centre City Development Corporation (CCDC). The appointed
members are all business people who have been able to keep
political leaders and others focused on the fact that Horton
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Plaza was unique.
Once CCDC was created, it was still necessary to have
someone with experience in implementing redevelopment
projects. Since the city had done minimal redevelopment,
there was no one on staff with the desired experience. After
a nation-wide search, the director of the Pasadena
Redevelopment Authority, who was responsible for Plaza
Pasadena, was hired. Once he came into the picture, the
project began to move along at a much quicker pace.
It was his experience in redevelopment, as well as his
entrepreneurial skills in politics and deal packaging, that
helped the project get off dead center. His heavy reliance on
professional consultants to provide the necessary information
for negotiating the city's position was critical. His skills
and experience were also instrumental in the project's ability
to survive the many crises that it did.
The mayor, who was a staunch supporter of downtown
redevelopment, did everything he could to promote the
development of Horton Plaza. He was very clear in his support
for downtown as a high priority and even pushed regional and
county entities to support the redevelopment of downtown as
one of their highest, if not highest, priority.
The city council was an important actor because they
had to approve the major changes to the Disposition and
Development Agreement (DDA). They were not willing to
automatically approve changes. They required well based
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reasons for changes they approved -- often despite public
opposition. It was also their adoption of the Centre City
Redevelopment Plan which was the first official document that
outlined the development and design requirements for downtown
development, that they proved the city was interested in
developing Horton Plaza as part of a greater scheme for
downtown. This action was a major signal for the developer,
and his prospective tenants, of the city's committment. The
council understood what the costs would be to bring retail
back downtown, and as representatives of the public interest,
wanted to maintain those costs at as low a level as reasonably
possible.
The Deal
Total public and private development costs are esti-
mated at $177 million. Private development costs, including
parking facilities are estimated to be around $140 million.
After a series of renegotiations, in the final deal the
city has committed approximately $33 million for:
. Land acquisition
. demolition
. residential and business relocation
. infrastructure improvements
. development of two theatre facilities in the
project.
In order to finance its portion, the city utilized a sophisti-
cated public financing strategy that included over $14.7 million
35
in tax increment financed bonds; proceeds from the sale of
properties for the retail center, hotel and parking; and
advances of funds by the city. No federal funds were used for
direct project financing, but they were used to fund
replacement housing.
A requirement placed on the city as a condition by the
developer was the city's committment to the development of a
convention center and nearby market rate housing. The city
was aware of the need for improvement of the area around the
project and used this requirement as justification for
pursuing further redevelopment of the area around Horton
Plaza.
The city estimates that its share of revenues from the
project will equal $117.5 million by 2015. These returns
include a 10% participation in overage rents, 33% of parking
"revenue surplus", a share of the sales tax generated from the
project, and new property tax revenue after repayment of
bonded debt. Over 3,300 permanent new jobs are expected to be
created and 25,000 shoppers are expected to visit the project
daily and spend over $80 million annually.
Critical Factors
Certainly the most critical factor that has contributed
to this project is the flexibility not only of the city, but
of the developer in renegotiating the conditions of the
business transaction. This flexibility was a clear indication
of the committment to the project by both the city and the
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developer. Either entity could have dropped out of the
transaction many times but choose instead to work out a way to
make the project work. Part of the reason for this
flexibility was the investment in time and money made by both
the city and the developer. As time wore on and more money
and time was spent on making the project work, it became
increasingly difficult to pull out. There were reasons other
than financial once the ultimate Horton Plaza scheme was
created. The project then became more than a major regional
retail center, it became something very unique to San Diego
and to the world of retailing. This uniqueness became a
driving factor, particularly for the chairman of the
development company who purchased $5 million worth of bonds to
keep the project alive. There were points, particularly in
the last few renegotiations, where some members of city
council were ready to drop out and find a new developer.
However, after listening to the reasons for the renegotiations
and hearing what the city's new financial role was, the
commitment remained with the existing developer.
A major factor for the city was the willingness of the
city council to take the necessary risks inherent in this type
of project. No doubt the mayor and the executive director of
CCDC played a critical role in working with the council to get
their support for the many necessary changes in the deal.
Another critical factor for the city was the expertise and
experience of the executive director of CCDC. It was partly
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due to his experience and his committment to this project that
it was successful. His experience from Plaza Pasadena was
certainly helpful in his ability to work with the complexities
of this project. CCDC provided him with the ability to work
outside of the political process in his negotiations. He did
have to re-enter the political process with the results of his
negotiations but he went with a very well prepared case and
support from the Mayor and the business community. The
primary objective became to get the project built.
Another factor in this project was the fact that the
city chose the developer it wanted to work with. Unlike the
previous two cases, this developer was chosen through a compe-
tition. The city chose the developer based on their
experience in the retail development business, particularly in
downtown retail development. The ability of the city to
select a developer to enter into a development project with,
increases the potential of success for the city. They were
able to select from some of the best retail developers. This
position for the city also requires that they have clear
objectives of what they want in a developer and in the
project. It also requires the city to understand what role
they play in the process. They are selecting a developer to
fulfill certain roles that they cannot. However, there are
roles the city can play that the developer cannot. By clearly
defining their roles, the city, through CCDC, and the
developer helped the process to move along smoothly even in
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light of the numerous changes that were made in the initial
agreement.
FANEUIL HALL MARKETPLACE
Located in Downtown Boston, this specialty/festival
center consists of approximately 160 stores and about 220,000
square feet of retail space housed in three, 536 feet-long
converted industrial and public market buildings, all of which
predate 1826. The project also includes 145,000 square feet of
office on the upper levels of the buildings. It is a very
active urban marketplace and festival center consisting of
specialty shops, varied pushcart vendors, food stores and
restaurants designed to attract office workers, residents and
tourists. The success of this project is illustrated by the
fact that last year it drew more people than Walt Disney World
in Florida. It took approximately six years from the
inception of the project to its opening date.
Motivation/Rational for Involvement
The marketplace buildings as well as most of those
surrounding them had become deteriorated and unsightly. Other
conditions in the area resulted in limited access to the
waterfront. These conditions were contributing to a blighted
downtown. The city moved to redevelop the area in such a
manner as to retain the historic atmosphere of the area
through the rehabilitation of the viable structures. Efforts
39
to redevelop the market area as private office buildings were
turned down. The prime motivating factor came from the Mayor.
He was sick and tired of looking out of his window in City
Hall at the eyesore that the marketplace had become. It was
embarassing for him to have people in his office able to view
such a degrading site in the city. With his encourage-ment
the city moved to do something to take care of the eyesore.
Organizational Aspects
In order to implement this project, the city utilized
its planning and development agency known as the Boston
Redevelopment Authority (BRA). This agency ultimately gained a
reputation as one of the most extensive and powerful
redevelopment agencies in the country.
The marketplace project was part of a designated
renewal district for which the BRA used typical renewal agency
powers (eminent domain, relocation, etc.) to gain control of
the land and buildings.
The BRA used a competition process to select developers
for the site. The BRA was aided in its decision-making process
by an advisory design review committee and professional finan-
cial consultants. In the first designation of a developer,
the BRA exhibited its lack of experience in dealing with the
complexities of development in marginal areas of the city.
They placed extraordinary requirements on the developer, such
that they were essentially unachievable. Because of this lack
of understanding of development, the BRA revoked the designa-
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tion of the developer when they were unable to meet some of
the early requirements of the agreement. The willingness to
be flexible when agreements ran into difficulty was a key
factor in the success of the previous cases.
In order to prevent fires and further deterioration of
the structures, the BRA went ahead and contracted for exterior
renovations, thereby increasing the city's investment in the
project beyond acquisition and relocation.
In the second selection process (which was not operated
as formally as the first) the BRA relied more heavily on their
own internal analysis of the proposals. Based on their
experience from the first competition, the BRA's conditions
were less stringent. As the project eventually got underway,
the BRA was also much more flexible in dealing with changes
and renegotiating to keep the deal alive.
Actors/Roles
The key actors in this project turned out to be the
architect from the first developer team, the Mayor, and the
business community.
The architect was instrumental in getting the eventual
developer to even consider the project. The architect worked
very hard to find a developer that believed in the concept he
had created/designed for the market. Once convincing the
developer, they both still had to convince the BRA to consider
their proposal. The BRA appeared to be strongly favoring
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another proposal.
At this point the conservative banking through contacts
of the developer, was rallyed to push for an open public
review of the proposals. It was also through the business
community that the person responsible for getting the public
review was contacted. This person was the mayor. Once he saw
a model of the project, he was convinced it would be the best
concept to develop. In the public hearing the business
community came out strongly in favor of the architect/developer
proposal. Based on this strong support of the business
community and the fact that this proposal was financially more
attractive than the one the BRA favored, and the fact that the
Mayor favored it, the city council unanimously approved it.
When it came time to get the necessary local financing
for the project, as required by one of the primary out-of-
state lenders, the conservative banking community seemed to
retreat. At this point the mayor called on the banks,
appealing to their civic duty to put financing into the
project. It was embarassing that out-of-state funds could be
secured but that local funds could not. As a result of the
pressure from the mayor and other community leaders, the local
banks finally contributed to the financing of the project.
While outwardly it does not appear that the mayor played that
active of a role, it is well known that if the mayor did not
like a project, it would not get city approval.
There were two mayors involved in this project, both of
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whom were instrumental in stimulating the business community
into the actions necessary at the time. The first mayor was
able to get the business community to develop a plan for the
area around and including Faneuil Hall. The second mayor was
the one who was able to get the project built.
The Deal
Substantial public financing was used to develop this
project in return for which the city shares in the overall
profits of the marketplace. Ownership and ultimate control of
the marketplace rest with the BRA, which has leased the
buidings to the developer at $1 per year for 99 years. By not
requiring the developer to pay for land, development costs
were reduced to a minimum. Federal funds were used to provide
most of the public portion of the project. Some funds were
provided by the state for transportation improvements. The
public funds were primarily used for property acquisition,
relocation of tenants, exterior building improvements, and
general public improvements. For its role, the city
essentially acts as a limited development partner, sharing a
percentage of the marketplaces net cash flow instead of
receiving traditional property taxes. The $17 million public
investment is approximately 35% of the total project costs.
The city receives a minimum $600,000 property tax
payment based on a graduated property tax schedule that is
tied to a percentage of gross rental income. (Actually based
on a definition of net income that was only 66 and 2/3 percent
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of the gross rent from retail space). As income rises, so
does the property tax payment to the city.
The city has and still receives other returns as a
result of the project. Faneuil Hall is credited with sparking
a whole resurgence of the area around it. In terms of
employement there are estimates of approximately 1800 jobs
generated by the marketplace. A net gain of 1580 over the 250
that were lost when the original merchants were moved to make
way for the marketplace. Due to the profit sharing basis for
tax receipts, the city is receiving property tax revenues at
about 10 times the old rate before redevelopment. State sales
taxes have been estimated at over $2.3 million per year.
Critical Factors
The role of the Mayor turned out to be the most
critical factor for the city. Once he decided that something
had to be done with the site, he saw to it that the city moved
to get something done. It was this motivation by the Mayor
that was also instrumental in the city's selection of the
ultimate developer.
The city, in its ability to select the developer, was
also able to select the type of development and the likelihood
of its success. In the second competition the city had a
choice of selecting a developer with little experience and a
proposal focusing on the rehabilitation of the buildings as a
minor activity center for the city, or selecting a proposal
that would not only rehabilitate the buildings but also
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provide a major activity center and provide a substantial cash
flow for the city. This second proposal was also being put
forth by a developer with significant experience in retail
development. Because the first proposal really satisfied the
needs of the city as originally defined, and because the main
staff people knew the developer, they were ready to select it
as the winning proposal. However, once the mayor became aware
of the second proposal and what it would mean to the city from
a financial as well as image standpoint, he moved to encourage
the selection of the second proposal. The ability of the city
to select the developer for the project placed some of the
responsibility for its success on the city. The city in its
final decision chose the developer that had experience in the
type of development that was being proposed as well as the
support of the business community. By using its ability to
select a developer that had the necessary experience and
financial and community support, as well as the one that was
providing the most to the city in terms of cash flow and image
enhancement, the city was improving the change of the
project's success.
The Mayor played another significant role in this
project when it came time to secure local financing for the
project. The developer had received his major financing from
an out of state bank that required the remaining financing
(approximately 1/3) come from local sources. While the
business community supported the project in concept, the
45
banking element was not willing to put any money into the
project. The Mayor was not very excited about the fact that
an out-of-state bank was providing the bulk of the financing
and the local banks would not provide any. Directly and
through his channels, the Mayor was able to appeal to the
banks on the grounds of civic responsibility to not only
support the project conceptually, but to support it with
reasonable financial assistance. The Mayor, using his
influence in a calculated manner was able to get the banks to
form a pool to provide the necessary funds to get the project
going.
PIKE PLACE MARKET
The Pike Place Market is a unique urban retail market-
place located in downtown Seattle, Washington. Unlike the
"new" urban festival marketplaces, Pike Place Market is an
authentic retail, food and farmers market. Originally built
in 1907, renovations begain in 1971 after the Market was
designated as an historic district. The Market provides a mix
of retail uses including food service, specialty crafts,
gifts, collectibles, secondhand merchandise, and some
services. Social service agencies, including a clinic, senior
center, and a day care center are also part of the Market.
The tenants of the Market are entirely owner-operated
establishments. No regional or national chain stores are
allowed in the market and no major store serves as a
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traditional anchor.
Motivation/Rational for Involvement
The Market was at one time a very lively part of the
city. It had operated primarily as a wholesale farmers market
but eventually the variety of goods that were available
increased. As time went on and farming methods and cost
changed, the market began to lose its level of activity. It
eventually became very deteriorated and in need of major
repairs. Those who wanted to raze the Market and replace it
with new office buildings (the city and the business
community) described the Market as a "decadent, somnolent
fire-trap". Those who wanted to save the Market (the
citizenry) had a much different view. They saw the Market as
"embodying a sense of values threatened by modern society ...
and honest place in a phony time." There were two motivating
factors battling to govern the development of the Market. The
factor that eventually won out had nothing to do with economic
development as was often at least part of the motivation in
the previous cases. The primary goal was to save an essential
part of the life of the city.
Organizational Aspects
The Pike Place Market Preservation and Development
Authority (PDA) was created to revitalize the Market and
manage its day-to-day activities. The seven-acre market has
been designated an historic district and is also part of a
larger urban renewal area which made it eligible for federal
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aid and local funding. The PDA performs its work under the
guidance of the Historical Commission.
The Historical Commission was established to oversee
the seven acre historic district. The powers of the
commission are broad and allow them to regulate the uses and
developmnet within the district. They were also required to
approve the plan for the redevelopment of the district prior
to city council approval. The Historical Commission oversees
the PDA through its policies and review procedures.
The PDA was formed because many felt that an
independent agency might have more credibility with the
public, especially in light of the city's original opposition
to the project. There were also many advantages to the city
in having a separate authority. It would not involve the city
council in any of the often sensitive tenant/landlord issues
or their day-to-day demands and disputes. The city also saw
the authority as an organization that could combine some of
the strengths of both a private developer and a public
development agency.
The PDA utilized a consultant to assess financial
feasibility of the rehabilitation and development of buildings
in the project area. The consultant also evaluated financial
mechanisms and commercial use limits. The recommendations of
the consultant were used as a basis for the eventual financing
and management of the project. The PDAs initial approach to
project financing was to provide "gap financing". Later in
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the project other forms were utilized including equity
syndication.
The PDA also used the city, primarily the Department of
Community Development (DCD) for a variety of services. It is
also the city's role to serve an oversight role, monitoring
the PDAs finances and accounting.
The Deal
The PDA acts as a developer of last resort, restoring
portions of the Market that are not economically viable for the
private sector to undertake. It just so happens that most of
the market is not economically viable for the private sector
so PDA has done most of the development.
Buildings owned and operated by the PDA were
rehabilitated and brought up to code requirements by the PDA
and subsidized by the city through a capital grant. $80
million of federal funds were used in this project. The city
acting as the urban renewal agent has channeled funds into the
historic district to improve streets, sewers and sidewalks and
to acquire property for redevelopment.
Rents are kept at a much lower level than would be
normal in order to support businesses that would not be
competitive in a normal situation. Despite the lack of a
priority on economic development, the project has generated
significant sales and stimulated additional development.
Actors/Roles
The actors responsible for the success of this project
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were not affiliated with the city or the business community.
This particular case is very different from those reviewed
previously. In those cases it was a public or private sector
leader that significantly contributed to the success of the
project. The primary actors responsible for the success of
this project were the coalitions of citizens that battled the
city and the business community to win the voters approval for
saving Pike Place Market. Opposed by nearly all the elected
officials of the city, the editorial voices of both major
newspapers, and the entire downtown business community, the
citizens initiative to save the Market won by 60% voter
approval.
It was some of the same organized citizenry that fought
to save the Market that also formulated the concept for the
PDA, and actively participated in a continuing process to make
sure the Market was saved. The Mayor, although one of the
leaders in the fight to raze the Market, was quick to provide
his support to the project after the referendum. The business
community was not so quick however. The downtown interests,
while not doing anything to harm the efforts to restore the
Market, did nothing to help it either. Despite this lack of
support, the organization that represents the organized
downtown business community claims credit for some of the
Market's success.
Critical Factors
The obvious critical factor in this case was the role
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played not by the city or the business community, but the role
played by the citizens. The Mayor and the business community
felt they could win the efforts to raze the Market in
traditional urban renewal fashion. Had they recognized the
significance of the Market to the community, a good deal of
time, money and effort could have been saved and re-directed
into the market in the first place.
In the previous cases citizens did not play a
significant active role in the projects. In Plaza Pasadena
they did come close however. In that case the city was able
to find another method of dealing with the project that was
not open to citizen efforts. In the previous cases, the city
council and/or the Mayor were able to represent the public
interest without significant citizen opposition.
When the citizens won the referendum to save the
Market, the Mayor altered his role to one of support. Since
it was clear what the public interest was, the Mayor, the city
council and city staff started to search for methods to make
the project work. This time they did not forget to include
the citizens in the project planning process. This continued
citizen participation in the planning as well as in the
implementation process, was further insured by the citizens
themselves. Efforts to include major business leaders in the
process proved futile however.
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Summary: Common Principles/Elements
It should be noted that these projects are all projects
of the 1970s. They were part of a series of efforts on the
heels of urban renewal, an effort that experienced many
problems. These projects were representative of a new
approach to downtown development. Rather than pursuing the
traditional contractual arrangements whereby the deal would
usually be nulified on the basis of non-performance, the
cities were more selective in who they chose to enter in
development agreements with. The projects still had some of
the old urban renewal aspects about them however. In all of
the projects the city had acquired the property through
eminent domain. In three cases the sites were left over from
an old urban renewal project. This is where much of the
similarity ceases however. The cities were essentially
masters of their own destiny. Perhaps the key difference in
these projects from the traditional urban renewal projects of
the 1960s was the active role the city played in whole
development effort. Both the developer and the city worked
together from the beginning of the project to see it through
to its completion. Another major difference was that the city
was using more than just federal dollars in the project. In
two cases, no federal dollars were used. This increased the
cities investment in seeing the project through as a success.
The new project of the 1980s will be different from
the project of the 1970s. With the loss of federal funding
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cities are going to have to find new methods to stimulate and
participate in downtown development projects. There are,
however, many lessons that can be learned from these projects.
Based on a review of the case studies, several key principles
(elements) can be derived that could be applied to future
projects in other cities. These principles are not intended
to be exhaustive nor are they the only principles a city
should be aware of. Every potential public-private
development partnership has unique aspects that cannot be
universally applied.
One of the first elements is motivation. Why is the
city participating in the project? What basis does the city
have for the project and for participating in the project? In
all but one case the city was motivated by a situation of
"crisis" or embarrassment. The cities were participating in
the projects in hopes of capturing severely needed tax dollars
and jobs as well as to improve a somewhat tarnished image of
downtown. In the Pike Place case, motivation was similar to
the other cases in that the goal was to save an essential part
of the city. This clear, well-established motivation helped
the city maintain its committment throughout what was often a
long process. Due to the potential length of the process, it
is critical that the motivation be strong enough to withstand
several changes in administration. Probably the key to the
strength of a city's motivation, and therefore its commitment,
is the ultimate goal it is trying to achieve through partici-
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pation in the project. In all the cases a major goal for city
participation in a project was to provide a stimulus for
further redevelopment of downtown. In no case was the city
participating for only the traditional real estate returns on
the project.
Another key element tied to the cities strength of
motivation and committment is flexibility. Because of the
long drawn out process associated with these projects, their
success depended on the willingness of both the city and the
developer to renegotiate when conditions changed to affect the
feasibility of the project. This flexibiity to renegotiate on
the city's part was because of its committment to what the
project meant for the city. There are, of course, limits to
flexibility and the city needs to be aware of how far it can
go before it loses its ability to maintain a reasonable
economic role in the project. A key to being flexible is the
trust between the city and the developer. There had to be
substantial justification for the changes. Another
contributing factor to flexibility was the investment in the
project at the time of the renegotiation. There was usually a
substantial investment in the project by both the developer
and the city. Because of this investment, both parties were
encouraged to create a new arrangement when conditions changed
to affect the feasibility of the project.
A third key element was organization. If the city did
not have the capability or the efficiency necessary to handle
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the project, they made changes so they could. In some cases
it meant re-organization of some kind, in others it meant the
use of consultants to provide essential backup information,
and in others it meant both. In all cases the city somehow
enhanced its ability to deal with the many aspects of the
development process, thereby improving their ability to
negotiate in the public interest.
A fourth key element turned out to be the role of the
business community. In all the cases the business community
played some role in the ultimate success or initiation of the
project. Some of the assistance they provided included such
activities as; providing resources for planning studies;
actively promoting the city/project to potential developers in
an effort to secure one; forming investment groups to help
finance projects; assisting in creating and nurturing support
for projects, and many other types of assistance. Except for
the Pike Place case, the business community role ultimately
enhanced the project. It would appear from the cases
therefore, that the focused involvement of the business
community in projects of this nature will most likely improve
their chances of success.
A fifth key element was the investment strategy/goals
of the city in the project. In all the cases except Pike Place,
the cities were at least considering economic development as
an objective. They were striving for an improved property and
sales tax base, increased job opportunities, and spinoff
55
development. In two of the cases however, this goal was
supplemented by a strategy that called for a direct cash
return on the city's investment. In some cases the city did
not have a well defined investment strategy or any goals
relating to their cash investment. The primary objective was
to get the project completed and provide public assistance to
do it. In all cases public assistance was necessary because
the city was restricting the maximum utilization of the site.
Rather than have the developers build dense, high return
office buildings, the city wanted less dense shopping
activities that could not work without financial assistance.
The sixth key element was the cities ability to select
the developer that they were going to work with. Whether
through a competition or direct negotiation, the city in its
selection of a developer was able to select the one with what
they felt were the necessary qualities to accomplish the
project successfully. The city was able to select the
developer because they were in control of the land on which
the project was to be constructed. The key however, is that
the city selected the developer that they were going to share
the public's resources with. This is a concept that can apply
even in situations where the city does not control the land.
The seventh element and the one that ties all the other
elements together is leadership. What is leadership? In
the book, Public-Private Partnership in American Cities:
(1982, Fosler & Berger) Lyall defines it as "the willingness
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to step in and take responsibility for solving a problem or
overcoming an obstacle." Based on these case studies and
other readings, I believe that leadership also includes the
willingness to step back and share in the responsibility for
solving a problem or overcoming an obstacle, or in other
terms, to know when to be led, or at least help in the
leading. In terms of these cases, there were some more
specific characteristics that the leaders portrayed including:
. the ability to garner support for the project and
maintain that support. This often required skills
in building and nurturing coalitions to provide the
necessary support,
. the ability to create a vision for the project and
the success of the project and to communicate that
vision,
. the ability to maintain the vision through the
turmoil it may experience,
. the ability to stimulate people into action in order
to accomplish the project,
. the ability to bring people together to mediate and
help solve disputes,
. the ability to see beyond this project to others
that are related.
In most of the cases there were phases of leadership.
These phases usually started with the business community and
were then transferred to the city -- usually the Mayor.
During and after the transfer however, there were still
leadership roles played by the business community and other
actors in the city -- usually the city council. The
complementary leadership roles that these actors played is
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what contributed to the success of the projects. It was up
to the business community to build the necessary support to
get the public sector to participate. However, when the
leadership responsibility shifted to the public sector, the
business community still had leadership responsibilities of
its own. The primary responsibility of the business community
was to complement the public leadership in efforts to maintain
and build support for the project, particularly when the
project ran in to problems. While at the same time, it was
the public sectors responsibility to continue to nurture as
well as build more support -- public and private. The primary
public sector leadership role was played by the Mayor. It was
his role to decide if the city should even participate in such
a project and if so, how much should the city be willing to
put into such a project.
Through a combination of these leaders, but primarily
through the city leader, motivation was generated and
maintained, committment and flexibility was supported and
substantiated, key actors in both sectors were stimulated to
fulfill their critical roles, the city organized itself to
operate as a more effective partner in the development process
and fulfilled their investment strategy/goals by working with
the developer they selected. Because of this leader, the
critical factors that were necessary for the city to
successfully accomplish the project fell into place.
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CHAPTER 2: THE DENVER SITUATION
Introduction
This chapter will briefly discuss the background of the
downtown Denver retail project. The chapter will then focus
on an analysis of the project utilizing the same framework
from Chapter 1;
1) Motivation/Rationale for Involvement
2) Organizational Aspects
3) Actors/Roles
4) The Deal
5) Critical factors
Due to the fact that negotiations are in progress and
no firm commitments have been agreed to by the city or the
developer, the analysis will only be able to evaluate the
project as it currently stands. The next chapter will focus
on strategies for the city.
The Centerstone retail project is currently in early
stages of planning and design. The project is located in the
heart of downtown Denver on a two block area adjacent to the
16th Street Mall, the retail center of downtown. The City of
Denver and the developers for the project, Oxford-Ansco and
The Reliance Development Group, have begun preliminary
official negotations, although informal negotiations have been
in process for several years. The informal negotiations were
primarily between the developers and the Denver Partnership, a
private sector non-profit downtown development organization.
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These informal negotiations focused primarily on design
issues, tenant strategies, public relations and process
facilitation. Preliminary schematic designs have been
prepared for the site by the Jerde Partnership of Los Angeles
(the designers of Horton Plaza in San Diego).
It's no secret that there is intense competition among
six developers in the Denver metropolitan area to land the
area's first high fashion department store, Saks Fifth Avenue
or Neiman Marcus in their project. It will require a special
effort to put a downtown location in a position to win the
competition.
PROJECT DESCRIPTION
The project as currently planned would take two city
blocks with a portion of the project spanning, as well as
extending below, the street that separates the blocks. The
project will ultimately consist of a 500,000 square foot urban
mall on 4 levels and two 650,000 square foot office towers,
one anchored on each block, of at least 30 stories each. The
towers will sit on top of the retail portion of the project.
The retail portion of the project is planned to include two
high-end anchor retailers and approximately 100 shops with
restaurants and theatres. Three levels of underground parking
will provide approximately 2,300 spaces. The total cost of
the project is estimated to be approximately $350 million.
(Note: See appendix for graphics of project.)
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Because the downtown office market is considerably
overbuilt, the project is currently planned to be built in two
or three phases. The first phase would include the entire
retail portion of the project. Due to the design of the
project, the first phase will have to include the underground
parking and the base superstructure for the office towers,
including elevator cores. The second phase would include at
least one of the office towers, possibly both, depending on
the market. The third phase would include the second office
tower if not completed in the second phase.
There are two major developers involved in the project,
each owning or controlling approximately half the project
area. One is Oxford-Ansco, which purchased almost half the
project area at a time when land values were near their peak
in Denver. The Oxford-Ansco land price is assumed to be
approximately $400 to $500 per sq. ft. The other major
developer is the Reliance Development Group, which has 135
years remaining on a ground lease from an old Denver family.
It appears that Oxford-Ansco suffers greater liability from
its involvement in their land than does Reliance.
The Reliance Development Group, based in New York City,
has developed one other office building in downtown Denver,
the 650,000 sq. ft. Amoco building. They purchased their
interest in the project area with the intention of building
another office building.
Oxford-Ansco is a partnership between Oxford Properties
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of Edmonton and Phillip Anschutz, a local oil and real estate
investor. Anschutz is a silent partner. Like Reliance,
Oxford-Ansco purchased its site with the intention of building
an office tower.
Denver is currently experiencing a 20% office vacancy
rate. Because of this situation it will be necessary to
financially structure the retail phase of the project so that
it will be feasible without the office space, at least in the
short run. In order to make the retail phase competitive with
outlying proposed retail projects, in terms of development
costs, it will be necessary for the City of Denver (or some
form of the public/non-profit sector) to participate in the
project, financially and/or otherwise.
The City is currently exploring its form of
participation in the project. A consultant has been hired to
perform a market study of the downtown as well as the
competing sites. The same consultant is also preparing a
proforma analysis of the project and assisting the city in its
negotiations.
Motivation/Rationale for Involvement
Unlike the cities reviewed in Chapter 1, there is not
an overwhelming feeling of crisis or embarrassment to motivate
the city to participate in this project. The general feeling
about the downtown among the longer tenured city council
members and civic leaders is a very positive one. They speak
of watching downtown slowly bringing itself back to the sort
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of place it was years ago -- a place with people.
There is, however, a general feeling that more needs to
be done to continue the revitalization of downtown. Recently
the focus has been on attracting major high-end retailers to
locate downtown. There is currently a perceived competition
among six sites in the metropolitan area to secure the "longed
for" high-end retailer. This perceived competition has served
to generate a sense of urgency among downtown interests to be
the first to secure the high-end retailer.
The opening of a major high-end retail outlet, or two,
in downtown is viewed a critical piece of the continuing
effort to revitalize downtown. Within the business community
there is sort of a sense of crisis regarding the efforts to
secure a high-end retailer downtown. The reason for this is
that due to the unique nature of the sought after high-end
retailer and the Denver market, it is believed that wherever
they locate will become "the" major retail location. It will
become "the" major location because other unique complementary
retail activities will locate near the high-end retailer,
making other locations less desirable. If downtown is unsuc-
cessful in securing a high-end retailer to provide further
stimulus to retail development and therefore a stronger
position for downtown in the regional market, it is felt that
downtown will be setback several years in its revitalization
efforts. This situation is further intensified by the fact
that the leading site in the competition for the high-end
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retailer is only 2 1/2 miles from downtown. If the high-end
retailer locates at this site, known as Cherry Creek, it is
believed by some that downtown would suffer severely as a
general retail location not just a high-end location. The
Cherry Creek location is planned to have 1.2 million square
feet of retail space with 4-6 major anchors, one of which will
be a high-end retailer. This amount of retail space alone,
this close to downtown is seen as a major threat to the future
of downtown as a desirable retail site. A major factor in the
Cherry Creek project's favor is the site's historical role as
a major central retail location. There is an existing center
on the site that when originally constructed, was the first
open mall shopping center in the country. The existing center
will be razed to make room for the new center. There are
some, however, that don't see the Cherry Creek project as a
threat. They see the project as perhaps helping the downtown
as a high-end retail location in the long run. It has been
noted that high-end retailers like to locate close to one
another, but not necessarily in the same project. It is
unlikely that Neiman Marcus and Saks Fifth Avenue, for
instance, would locate in the same project, although they
would still like to be close to one another. If one locates
in Cherry Creek, the downtown location would still be close
enough for the other. If the Cherry Creek site is developed
first, then efforts could be focused on improving downtown as
a residential neighborhood, which would enhance its
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desirability as a retail location.
There are the general economic development motivators
of increased sales and property tax, jobs, spinoff
development, etc. to encourage the city to participate in the
project. These motivators are further enhanced by the fact
that because of federal cutbacks, the city will have $25
million less in its general fund this year. This deficit will
continue for the next several years and possibly increase.
Though this deficit is not a major motivator for the downtown
site, it certainly has a role. It should be noted that 3 of
the 6 competing sites for the high-end retailers are within
the city limits of Denver. This means that realistically,
despite a publicly announced mayoral policy advocating the
downtown site, the city must be careful not to alienate the
retailers and cause them to locate outside of the city limits.
The city has not adopted a formal retail strategy or
up-to-date downtown plan that places the project or future
projects into any sort of context or provides goals and
objectives for the city in pursuing these types of projects.
The city and the business community is, however, in the
process of jointly formulating a public/private Downtown Plan
and Civic Development Strategy that will provide a context for
future downtown development. Despite the lack of a formal
retail strategy for downtown (a formal strategy has been
developed by the business community) the mayor has publicly
announced a policy that advocates the placement of major high-
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end retailers downtown.
Organizational Aspects
The primary city staff people working on the project
include a key mayoral assistant who is the city's prime
negotiator, the Director of Downtown Development and the
Director of Finance. The city is utilizing a professional
consultant to help provide technical and strategic support.
The consultant has prepared an extensive market
analysis for the project. His analysis includes an overview
of the markets for the competing sites as well. The
consultant has also prepared an extensive proforma analysis of
the project to use as a basis for negotiating the city's
participation in the project. The consultant that the city is
utilizing was chosen for his ability to assess the retail
market, conduct project feasibility analysis, and package
financial requirements of the project. The consultant was
also chosen because of his knowledge of some of the major
retailers and their needs. the major areas where the
consultant lacks direct experience are in working from the
public sector viewpoint, as well as in working on
public/private downtown retail projects. One of the primary
roles of the consultant is to help the city develop an
investment strategy for public participation in the project.
While the financial consultants used in three of the cases in
Chapter one had extensive private experience, they also had
significant experience in advising the public sector. It was
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the ability to see the needs of the project from "both sides
of the table" that made those consultants so valuable to the
process. The private sector orientation of the city's
consultant in Denver will certainly provide critical insight,
but the lack of public sector experience may hinder their
ability to appreciate, and therefore, negotiate a public role
in development.
Negotiations thus far have been in two parts. The
city's consultant meets alone with the developer to discuss
"numbers" and represent the city's position in the negotiations.
The city's prime negotiator in this project also meets
separately with the developer to further lay a base for city
participation in the project.
The city recently reorganized several related functions
to be under the supervision of one director. The city's
planning director became the Director of Planning and Economic
Development. The position includes responsibility over the
Zoning Administration, the Community Development Agency as
well as the Planning Office and economic development. The
reorganization was primarily to improve efficiency and
coordination between the departments. The changes did not
specifically do anything to help the city in its ability to
negotiate and implement its participation in this project or
others like it. The city does have an urban renewal
authority, however, it is not involved in the project
currently nor has a role been defined for it in the future.
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Actors/Roles
There are four primary actors in this project: the
city council, the city administration (the mayor and his
staff), the developer, and the downtown business community.
Unlike the previous cases reviewed, there is a clear
dichotomy between the city council and the mayor. While there
were definite conflicts from time to time in the cases, there
was still an apparent overall level of cooperation between the
two. Such is not the case in Denver, a condition that could
jeopardize this project and has already jeopardized others.
City Council: The city council will play an important
role in this process because they will have to approve any
agreement the city enters into with the developer of the
project. Based on the experience of the city council and the
mayor on other projects of similar complexity, there may be
difficulty getting the necessary support. Of the 13 council
members, only 5 can be considered allies of the Mayor.
There are some council members who understand the need
for public participation in the project and will potentially
support it. There are some who will fight any public support
at all. There are probably some who will fight the project
because its something the mayor has worked hard on, and will
use any excuse to oppose the project. There are also some
council members that are planning to run for mayor in the next
election. These members will potentially attempt to defeat
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the project in order to make the mayor look unproductive, and
improve their position in the election.
Council members have openly voiced displeasure with
their working relationship with the mayor and his
administration in general, as well as with specific members of
his administration.
Despite all the problems of the past, there is still a
flicker of possibility that the mayor and the council can get
together on this project.
The council recently created a special council
committee specifically to deal with downtown issues.
The council membership is made up of neighborhood
oriented interests. There are no strong downtown business
community interests on the council. This make-up has often
caused problems between the downtown business community and
the council when dealing with downtown oriented issues. The
working relationship between council and the downtown business
community, like the one between the council and the mayor, has
not been a smooth one by any means.
The Mayor and his Administration: The mayor defeated
the incumbent of 14 years on a platform of "Imagine a Great
City." The mayor's strength in winning the election was in
his ability to build the support of a broad base of neighbor-
hood and business interests.
One of the mayor's campaign promises was to reinvolve
the community in city government. In an effort to accomplish
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this he has utilized a committee process for tackling major
development issues as well as to recommend candidates for key
staff positions.
His efforts to exert leadership on major development
issues have been met with much opposition by the council.
Some opposition and controversy associated with major issues
can be healthy. However, it can also be destructive.
In three of the cases reviewed, the mayor was a major
actor in the events surrounding the success of the projects.
It was the mayor that had the vision, the ability to gain the
support and cooperation of the business community as well as
the city council. In this case, the city, through the mayor
has assumed the lead role in the process of determining what
the city can do to make this project successful. The mayor of
Denver, however, will have a tough time achieving the success
of the mayors in the cases, unless the city council support
can be attained.
The Downtown Business Community: The major downtown
business interests have organized into a very powerful entity
called the Denver Partnership Inc. This group has multiple
capabilities and functions. It provides lobbying on behalf of
downtown interests, manages the maintenance and operation of
major public facilities (the 16th Street Mall, the DCPA,
Skyline Park), has a planning and urban design staff as well
as development packaging expertise.
The Partnership has been involved in this project for
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some time. They are credited with generating the original
concept as part of a retail strategy they developed through
staff, consultants and members. Through the efforts of the
Partnership, the two developers that control the separate
sites were brought together to create the project partnership
that now exists. In order to bring the developers together,
the president of the Partnership and the Director of Civic
Design and Development for the Partnership, met with them
individually to discuss the master concept for their property.
Eventually the meetings were held with both of the developers
together resulting in the current joint effort. Without the
facilitative role that the Partnership played through the
creation and communication of the concept plan for the
project, it is highly unlikely that the developers would have
ever taken the initiative to do the project on their own. The
Partnership was also very active in approaching the major
high-end retailers and marketing downtown as a viable location
for their outlets. For these efforts, the Partnership
suggested to the developers that they receive an equity
position in the project. When compared with the cases as well
as projects in other cities, this request was quite out of the
ordinary for downtown interests, organized or otherwise. In
the other cases, majority buiness interests were more than
willing to do what they could to facilitate the success of a
project of this nature. Services that business communities in
other cities provided ranged from actively seeking developers
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to assisting in leasing efforts, to providing cash as
investors to improve the financial feasibility of the project.
The business communities saw their returns through revitalized
businesses and property values for their efforts. This
request by the Partnership appears quite ironic. On the one
hand the business community speaks of the desperate need to
get the high-end retailer located downtown and of the need for
public subsidy to do it, and on the other hand they are asking
for a "piece of the action" in a project that needs all the
help it can get, and that would unquestionably benefit their
constituency, without accepting any of the risk. True, they
have provided services of some sort to the project but the
question really relates to the goals and purpose of the
Partnership in serving their constituency.
The Partnership has also paid for market studies to
substantiate the market for high-end retail downtown. They
have also paid for numerous studies (impact, community design,
traffic, etc.) of the major competing site, Cherry Creek.
Another critical role the Partnership played in the
concept design of the project was the introduction of a
retail-oriented architect to design the shopping areas. The
developers agreed to use the Jerde Partnership for the retail
portion of the project and select an office architect later.
It appears that the strategy of the Partnership has
developed into a focused effort to "defeat" the Cherry Creek
site as an alternative site for high-end retailers, rather
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than focusing on methods of business community participation
to make the downtown project feasible.
The role of the business community in this project has
changed to a passive one directly, yet very active indirectly.
The "direct" role of the Partnership has changed considerably
now that the city has taken the lead in the project. The
efforts of the Partnership are centered on the maintenance of
private sector support for the project, as well as continued
lobbying of city council and administration. The lobbying
generally takes the form of formal or informal meetings of key
Partnership staff and members, with council and administration
members. Indirectly, the Partnership is very busy working to
improve the downtown retail project by focusing considerable
resources on strategies to "defeat" the Cherry Creek project.
The Partnership design staff has been developing alternative
development schemes that would be more appropriate to the
Cherry Creek site than a super regional shopping center. Some
of these early schemes were created in full cooperation and
participation of the neighborhoods surrounding the site.
Although their concepts are unquestionably more appropriate
from an urban design perspective they are not necessarily
welcomed with open arms. Many of the Cherry Creek business
intersts are very enthusiastic about the prospects of a new
shopping center next to their businesses. The neighborhood
interests, however, are very concerned about the impact of the
center on the quality of their neighborhoods. While the
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Denver Partnership represents the majority of the downtown
business interests, there are other organized groups in
downtown. The two primary groups are the Downtown Residents
Organization and the Lower Downtown Property Owners
Association. These two organizations are usually closely
allied with the Partnership on major issues. There is another
organization, the Downtown Neighborhood Association (DNA),
that was formed to oppose the site selected for the new
convention center. The DNA represented disgruntled property
owners that wanted the new convention center located in the
area where they owned property. The DNA is not a very
powerful group nor is it closely allied with the Partnership.
The Deal
There is a major difference between the type of deal
being negotiated for this project and those covered in the
cases. In this situation, the develpers control the land not
the city. Further complicating the situation is the fact that
the developers gained control of their land when prices were
$400 to $500 per square foot. This makes the likelihood of a
land write-down unreasonable. Another dissimilarity is the
use of federal funds. In three of the cases, federal funds
played a significant role in the public portion of the
project. There will most likely be no use of federal funds in
this project. The other two cases utilized tax increment
financing.
The current city strategy is to get the developers to
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realize a return on the land portion of the project through
the completion of phases II and III, the office towers. In
the city's proforma analysis for the project they are not
including the cost of the land. It is also interesting to
note that the developer is not revealing what their land costs
are. The city is also adamant about not participating in any
cost element of the office portion of the project, feeling
that it would not be in the public interest.
The developer has been looking to the city to provide
up to $50 million to the project. Their approach to the city
has been as to an "open cookie jar", seemingly expecting the
cash and support as givens. The city, however, is approaching
the project much differently. It wants to "invest" in the
project only if it will receive substantial returns, financial
and/or economic development.
Options that the city is exploring for its participa-
tion in the project include:
. the use of all or a portion of approximately
$20 million cash available through urban
renewal close-out procedures
. the use of tax increment financing
- the city wants to keep size of
district to the area of the
project
- the business community is in
favor of a larger district, up
to the size of the entire CBD
. build a parking garage
- city wants any garage it pays
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for limited to users of retail
portion of project
- developer wants the garage to be
available to office users also.
In order to use tax increment financing, the city will
have to issue a finding of blight. Depending on the size of
the district and on the justification for the boundaries,
there could be some major political problems. In California,
the courts have been extremely lenient in what they have
allowed cities to consider blight. They have basically
deferred to the locality and have upheld most findings of
blight on the basis that the communities can better define
blight than the courts. The Colorado courts may be the least
of the problems in this case however. There will undoubtedly
be political problems with finding blight conditions adjacent
to the 16th Street Mall, with land values estimated at $400 to
$800 per square foot. There has also been discussion about
encouraging the participation of another developer in the
project. There would be definite advantages in getting the
involvement of a major retail developer that could provide the
necessary expertise and connections to improve the likelihood
of attracting a high-end retailer.
Critical Factors
At the current stage of the project, there are some
critical factors that have contributed to the project's
"success" thus far. There are also some critical factors that
are hindering the ultimate success of the project.
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The factors that have contributed to the "success" of
the project thus far have been oriented around the role of the
business community. Their active marketing of downtown and
the project has been credited with putting the downtown
location in the competition for the high-end retailer. Prior
to any action by the downtown business interests, downtown was
totally out of consideration. The business interests were
also instrumental in facilitating the two developers of the
project entering into a agreement to jointly develop their
sites. They were also responsible for getting the developers
to use an architect with the type of retail design experience
necessary for this type of project.
Another critical factor contributing to the "success"
is the role of the city, led by the mayor. The mayor
understands the necessity of public participation in the
project and is willing to search for ways to make the project
work. This leadership role by the mayor will be the key to the
ultimate success of the project.
The main factor hindering the success of the project is
the friction between the mayor, including his administration,
and the city council. In order for this project to succeed
there is going to have to be an improved relationship between
the two.
Another factor hindering the success is the city's
financial situation and the high cost of land in the project.
In the cases reviewed, the cities were able to write down land
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costs for the developers. In this case that will not be
possible. This situation will require the city to be much
more creative in structuring their financial contribution to
the project. Because of this required creativity, there is
going to have to be strong motivation on the part of the city
to maintain their committment through some potentially heated
controversy.
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CHAPTER 3: RECOMMENDATIONS
To quickly review the current status of the Centerstone
project, the City and the developer are still engaged in
negotiations over the city's role in the project. There have
been no agreements reached as to what the city's contribution
will be to the project or what form the city's returns will
take. The developer has determined that it needs a city
contribution "in the range of $50 million." The developer
will not reveal the exact amount of a minimum contribution it
feels it needs or where in the "range" the $50 million falls.
There have been estimates by people generally familiar with
the project that place the minimum amount needed by the
developer at $90 million. There are others, however, who
estimate the minimum amount closer to $25 million. This
contribution, the form it takes and what returns the city will
receive, are the issues currently being negotiated. At this
time, the city is in no way legally nor financially committed
to this project. It has committed staff, and resources for a
consultant, to try and negotiate a role for the city to make
the project viable.
This chapter will attempt to outline a set of
recommendations that considered together, will represent a
potential strategy for the city to use in dealing with the
Centerstone project. The recommendations will be based on the
key elements identified in Chapter 1. Those elements were:
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1) Motivation
2) Organization
3) Flexibility
4) Role of the business community
5) Investment Strategy/goals
6) Leadership
For each of the above elements, there will be a general
discussion of strategy, followed by more specific
recommendations for the Mayor's action.
Motivation: All the primary actors need a common reason for
lending their support and energy to this project and the
arrangement necessary to make it successful. Individually,
there may be a multitude of reasons for each actor to
participate. There is some motivating factor however, that
needs to be present to provide a common thread to bind the
project between the actors. This common thread of motivation
will be essential in order to get the project underway and to
provide continual support through periods of controversy and
opposition. In the cases motivation was rooted in crisis or
embarrassment. This is not the case for this project -- yet.
A great deal of public and private investment has been placed
downtown yet it continues to flounder. The fact that it has
to fight in this competition is a clear indicator that
downtown is still struggling for success. All the actors
involved need to focus on the primary goal of improving and
enhancing the investments they currently have in downtown.
For the city those investments include infrastructure,
80
services and facilities. Perhaps more critical to the city's
investment is the role of downtown in the city's economy. A
significant portion of the city's revenues are derived from
sales and property taxes generated downtown. With the loss
of federal funding, this tax base is going to become even more
important. Efforts to enhance that base will undoubtedly
result in improved returns to the city. The public has
already invested substantially in downtown through the $72
million Sixteenth Street Mall, the Skyline Urban Renewal Pro-
ject, the Denver Center for the Performing Arts and other
public facilities. In the case studies, the cities received
economic development returns in the form of increased tax
revenues, jobs as well as additional spinoff development.
There is great potential that this project will do the same
for down-town Denver, however, this potential needs to be
quantified and estimated in order to help create some motiva-
tion. While members of city council have voiced support for
city involvement in this type of project, they have also said
that the investment must make sense. The quantification of
potential benefits will help make some of the "sense."
For the downtown business community, their investments
are in their businesses and in their property. Returns to
them will be an increase in the value of both.
Another motivating factor for participating in this
project is the image impact on downtown. In the case studies
this was one of the main motivating factors. Although
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downtown Denver is not in the same state of deterioration as
those cities, its image as the major Rocky Mountain regional
center is rapidly being taken away by the extensive suburban
development taking place around the city. This project could
help the city to regain its role as the undisputed center of
the region and polish the tarnished "crown" of the "Queen City
of the Plains." Whatever the motivation, the city council,
the business community, and potentially neighborhood interests
need to have enough of it to work in a cooperative manner to
provide the necessary support to make the project successful.
The level of motivation present will determine in a
large part how creative the city can be in its participation
in the development. The actors also need an understanding of
the risk/reward relationship of participating or not
participating in this project.
Motivation/Recommendations: The following recommendations
will help to strengthen and build the necessary motivation for
this project.
1) Create a context for the project greater than the
16th Street Mall. If this is not accomplished through the
Downtown Plan, then a more specific development plan needs to
be created that will. The plan should articulate how the
retail project (Centerstone and others) fits into an overall
scheme for the continued revitalization of downtown. The plan
should show how other potential projects (retail, office,
residential, etc.) will relate to one another. It needs to be
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clear that this is not a piecemeal attempt to bring some life
into downtown but that it is instead part of a larger cohesive
effort to revitalize downtown. A critical part of the plan is
its adoption and acceptance by the city council and the
downtown interests.
2) Quantify the benefits of the project. Identify and
quantify how the project will benefit downtown and the city as
a whole. The increase in jobs, property and sales tax
revenues that are directly related to the project should be
estimated. Of equal importance are the estimates of spinoff
development impacts and potential. What will this project do
for other projects that are planned? What will it do for the
existing retail trade downtown? What other sorts of
development will be stimulated as a result of this project?
How will this project, and the others it may stimulate, affect
the "quality of life", the image of downtown. Comparisons
should be made to the impact of Cherry Creek on city revenues.
While the Cherry Creek project alone may generate more sales
tax revenues than the downtown project alone, comparisons need
to be made of the impacts on traffic, neighborhoods,
infrastructure, as well as of the potential for spinoff
development. Compare the potential for spinoff development as
a result of both projects and show how the downtown project,
as part of a plan for other projects, will generate more
benefits for the city than the Cherry Creek project. This is
not to say that the city should object to the redevelopment of
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Cherry Creek. The city should seek a balanced approach to the
development and goals of downtown and Cherry Creek. To help
communicate the impact of the retail project on downtown, a
variety of scenarios could be created that would show the
potential impacts on downtown.
It would be premature at this point to address the
project specific financial returns that the city may receive.
To address the concept would be appropriate, however.
3) Seek out City Council: While the first two
recommendations will surely help to build some motivation
among council members, only they know for sure what it will
take to really get them motivated. Through one-on-one
sessions with the individual council members or in work
sessions with all of them, or a combination of both, the mayor
needs to find out from council what it will take to get their
support. Where there are points of disagreement or general
non-support, the mayor needs to act as a mediator and develop
a point of consensus. Through this process a certain amount
of "ownership" should be created among council so that they
will have an interest in seeing the project through.
4) Seek out the business community: The business
community appears to have no lack of motivation. They are the
ones primarily responsible for the project up until now. What
kind of continued support can the mayor expect from the
business community? Are there factions within the downtown
community that may present a problem and need additional
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efforts to gain their support?
Organization: The continued utilization of a consultant by
the city to provide the necessary technical and experiental
backup is essential. It may be necessary to use additional
consultants with expertise in tax increment finance analysis,
economic development impact analysis, specialized legal
assistance, etc. The city should not hesitate to use
specialized consultants for assistance in the areas it lacks
expertise.
The city needs to consider how it can best facilitate
and implement this project as well as others in the downtown
area. There will most likely still be a need for public
involvement in other types of real estate development
downtown. The city also needs to consider how it can create a
process that will take into consideration the interests of the
public and private sectors when pursuing involvement in
development. The city's creation of a non-profit, autonomous,
development corporation that would be made up of city and
downtown interests, may be the best alternati8ve. The entity,
working on the basis of a plan (currently being developed)
could pursue the continued revitalization of downtown by
creatively utilizing public finance techniques. The support
for the entity could be derived from a combination of public
and private funds. In order to keep the staff down to a
minimum, the entity could utilize consultants to provide the
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necessary analysis and backup information for negotiating
public roles in development. The entity would be able to
provide the necessary consistency to follow a project through
to its completion This separate entity may also help to
resolve some of the problems between the council and the
mayor, provided the council has a role in its creation. This
entity, organized for a specific public purpose, would be
governed by a board of directors whoe members would be drawn
from the public sector (inc. city council) and the downtown
business community. The nature of the entity, as a quasi-
public development corporation, would allow it to operate
outside of the time consuming public bureaucracy and give it
the ability to act quickly, be flexible, and conduct business
privately. While the entity would be generally insulated from
the "politics" of the city, it would still have a degree of
political accountability. Its possible that the existing
Urban Renewal Authority could be utilized in some fashion.
However, it would be necessary to perform some public relation
moves such as renaming the authority as well as hiring a new
executive director with experience in working with non-
federally assisted development deals.
Organization/Recommendations: The following recommendation is
intended to help the Mayor improve the capability of the city
to manage its role in the development of this as well as other
projects.
1) Create a quasi-public downtown development
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corporation: Work with city council and the downtown business
community to build the necessary support for the corporation.
The board of directors of the corporation should include
members of the downtown business community as well as the city
council. This corporation should not be created if this
project is to be its only project. There may be some
resistance to the corporation concept by the business community
and the council. Therefore, it is essential that their
concerns be sought out well before any firm proposals for the
corporation are made. Their concerns can be incorporated into
draft proposals for the corporation. It is possible that the
corporation could be set up similar to the 16th Street Mall
Management District (MMD). The MMD operates under the
direction of a board of directors made up of district property
owners and public officials. The city council contracts,
through the MMD board of directors, with the Denver
Partnership for the day-to-day operations of the mall
district. The downtown development corporation could operate
in a similar manner and contract with Denver Civic Ventures
(the non-profit, urban design and development packaging arm of
the Denver Partnership) for operational support. It would
still be necessary to have an executive director that would be
working only for the corporation, and that would be acceptable
to the city council, the mayor and to the business community.
The selection of this director should be the responsibility of
the board of directors of the corporation. The ability of
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this director to work with the diverse interests involved in
downtown will be paramount, as will his knowlege of public
sector involvement in real estate development. An excellent
model to investigate further is the Centre City Development
Corporation in San Diego, California, discussed in Chapter 1,
and the model that it was based on, Charles Center-Inner
Harbor Management Incorporated in Baltimore, Maryland.
The entity could pursue projects in the Golden
Triangle, the Silver Triangle and in lower downtown as well as
other projects along the Mall.
Flexibility: The city and the developer both need to be
willing to renegotiate the terms of the deal in order to keep
the project alive. It is key that the private developer look
at the city as an equal partner in the project, not a source
for unrestrained funds and assistance. Any renegotiation
should be a result of unforeseen circumstances that affect the
ability of one of the parties to fulfill their obligations.
The degree of flexibility of any of the participants will be
determined by their level of commitment to the project. In an
effort to balance the commitment of both the city and the
developer to the project, arrangements should be made to
equalize the risk as the project is built. This can be
accomplished by both the developer and the city contributing
their proportional funds at the same rate. This procedure
will help to encourage both the city and the developer to
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renegotiate when problems arise that threaten the feasibility
of the project. It may not be possible for the project funds
to be advanced in this manner. This is where motivation plays
a major role. There must be a purpose that is broader than
the financial aspects of the negotiated deal for both the city
and the developer to be working together on this project.
The city needs to be prepared for a variety of
situations that may cause a restructuring of the deal.
Flexibility/Recommendations: The following recommendations
may be more critical later in the process but should be kep in
mind from the beginning:
1) Focus on interests, not on positions: Probably the
key to maintaining flexibility through the negotiations as
well as renegotiations is the ability to keep all the parties
involved focused on their interests in the project. That
primary interest should be on making the project a success for
both the city and the developer. In pursuing this approach,
efforts can be made to find solutions that will benefit both
the city and the developer. Situations in which "positions"
are taken and battled over will most likely result in an
unsuccessful project, due to the inability to find a common
"middle ground" for agreement. The city needs to know its
"interests" in the project and be willing to restructure its
obligations in order to achieve that interest. The developer
should also approach the project in this manner, although they
will have a narrower field within which to achieve their
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interests.
2) Be prepared for surprises: Develop a range of
alternative methods to fulfill the city obligation in case of
unforseen problems later in the project. More important than
the alternatives however, is the awareness that problems may
arise and it may be necessary to change negotiated agreements.
3) Equalize financial contributions: If possible,
there should be an equalized rate of contributing funds to the
project so that both parties are equally sharing the risks.
Role of the Business Community: It is essential that
the Mayor encourage the business community to play a proactive
role in the project. Their role in continued support and
lobbying for the project will be critical. The business
community could also provide other forms of support such as
searching out mechanisms whereby the business community could
provide financial assistance to the project. The mechanisms
could range from low interest loan pools to equity
contributions through investment groups to leasing
commitments, in an effort to improve the project's
feasibility. The business community could also sponsor
workshops that highlight how other cities have participated in
these types of retail projects. Another role they could play
would be to provide resources for additional consultants if
they are necessary. It would be more advantageous to focus
the business community's efforts and resources on the downtown
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retail project rather than on the Cherry Creek project. The
business community should be engaged to work on the role they
can play in improving the likelihood of the projects success.
Business Community/Recommendations: The following
recommendations are intended to guide the Mayor in
facilitating the business community's continued role in the
project.
1) Private Sector Investment Mechanism: Encourage the
business community to create a mechanism for generating funds
for potential investment into this and/or future projects.
This would help to spread the risk of the project among those
who will benefit as well as provide necessary capital. This
mechanism, coupled with the downtown development corporation
recommended earlier, will provide greater resources and
capital for development efforts downtown.
2) Encourage the business community: Encourage the
business community to provide continued lobbying efforts to
build support for the project among skeptics. Consult with
the business community to get their input on the creation of a
development corporation and the designation of a tax increment
finance district. Determine how much and what kind of support
they would provide for both.
Investment Strategy/Goals: The city needs to determine
its investment goals before committing any resources to this
project. The bottom line that the city will be pursuing will
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be much different that the developers. However, this should
not prevent the city from seeking percentages of rent
overages, project appreciation, etc. The city will be at risk
in this project just as the developer and they should be
compensated for those risks. For the city the risks may be
politically oriented more than financial, although there will
still be financial risks.
In terms of returns, the city should be seeking
economic development returns as well as other more traditional
returns. In order to help justify city participation, those
returns should be estimated and compared with investment in
other projects like Cherry Creek. Projections can be make
that will estimate the sales taxes, the number of jobs, the
property tax increment, the impact on surrounding businesses,
etc., that this project will generate. The obligation of tax
payers should also be clarified from the public's perspective.
Investment Strategy/Recommendations: The following
recommendations are intended to give the mayor direction in
laying a foundation for pursuing and participating in this
project.
1) Identify project goals/objectives: The city needs
to identify specific goals and objectives that it is trying to
achieve through this project.
2) Identify investment goals and objectives: The city
needs to decide if it is pursuing economic development
returns, financial returns or both. The city needs to try and
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determine some minimum returns, based on their level of
investment, below which they cannot participate in this
project.
3) Quantify Benefits of the Public Contribution:
Based on the amount of public contribution to the project, it
can be determined how the developer is benefiting. The degree
of benefit that the developer is receiving will help to
determine the returns that the city should be pursuing.
4) Tax Increment Financing Study: Analyze a variety
of tax increment financing district sizes and configurations
as a mechanism to finance public participation in this and
other developments.
Selection of Developer: In all of the case studies the city
had the ability to choose the developer it was going to work
with. In choosing the developer the city was able to select
the qualities it felt were necessary to accomplish the
project. In this case, the city does not have the ability to
select the developer in the same sense as those cities in the
case studies. The city can select the projects it wants to
participate in based on the qualifications of the developer
and the contributions of the project to the city. Although
other potential proposals for this type of development are not
nearly as refined as Centerstone, the city should be prepared
to seek out other prospects in case this one fails. In this
project the city can encourage the use of an additional
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developer with more of the retail experience needed for this
type of project. In this particular project, given the
financial conditions, that may a difficult task.
Selection of a Developer/Recommendations: The following
recommendations are intended to guide the Mayor in making
decisions regarding the city's relationship with the current
developer.
1) Determine developer qualifications: Identify the
qualifications the city feels a developer should have in order
for the city to participate in this type of project. For
instance, does the current developer have experience in the
type of retail development planned? If not, an effort should
be made to include a developer that does. If the project does
not have the financial capability to fund an additional
developer, see if the business community can generate the
resources to pay their fee.
2) Determine when to try something else: The city
needs to determine at what point in these early negotiations
it should try another project with a different developer.
There is some point in this project where the public's
interest will no longer be served, and it's important that
city not go below that point.
Leadership: The key element that ties all the above elements
together and enhances the likelihood of the projects success
is leadership. All the actors identified in Chapter 2 will
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need to play a leadership role of one kind throughout the
process. There will be times for each actor to lead and to be
led, and knowing when to do which, will move this project
along.
The primary leader in this project should be the mayor.
The nature of the position affords the opportunity to work on
multiple fronts to bring together the necessary support for
the project. Through the Mayor's abilty to work with people
and build coalitions, a method of working with the council and
the business community can be created.
Through the mayor, some of the consistent leadership
necessary for this project can be tapped. One potential
strategy for the mayor to pursue is to meet one-on-one with
each of the primary actors in the project; one-on-one with
each council person to find out what they need to support the
project; one-on-one with key leaders of the business community
to find out what types of support they can provide to the
project and to encourage them to consider some they never
thought of; one-on-one with key staff to be certain they are
aware of the mayors goals in the project; one-on-one with the
developer to assure them of the city's commitment and to
determine their commitment; one-on-one with the chairman of
the boards of the retailers being courted to assure them of
the city's seriousness in this project and to show that the
city is prepared to deal.
Before undertaking this strategy the mayor needs to be
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certain that this project warrants this kind of energy and
commitment. Is this project the type of project that will
help the city achieve its goals for downtown? If so, is the
cost of public participation worth the returns that the city
will receive? Even if the answers to these questions are
affirmative, is this still a high enough priority project that
the mayor should devote a considerable amount of his, and his
administration's staff to it? Is there a more efficient way
of utilizing the business community and their resources in
order to help the project along? How does this project sit in
terms of priorirites for the mayor with other projects like
the Platte Valley, the convention center, downtown housing,
major league baseball, etc.? Should the mayor spend his time
pursuing the one-on-one strategy for a different project?
Exerting subtle leadership with council will be necessary in
order to gain their support. Efforts to include the council
in this project in a productive manner as early as possible
should be made. In the same manner that a developer should
include neighborhoods in his planning process, so should the
administration try to include the council in their planning
process. By trying to work in sort of a "public/public"
partnership between the mayor (including his administration)
and the council, perhaps some "bridges" can be built that will
later provide the necessary support for the project. The
concept of creating a separate entity to handle this project,
with council input to its creation, may also create the
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necessary neutral ground through which the council, the mayor,
and the business community can work to develop this and other
projects that will stimulate the continued revitalization of
the downtown area.
In another arena the mayor needs to deal with the
competition aspect of the high-end retail location. There
needs to be a balanced approach to dealing with the Cherry
Creek location and the downtown location so that the needs of
the city, the neighborhoods and the developer can be met.
Leadership/Recommendations: The following recommendations are
based on the assumption that the mayor has made this project a
high priority.
1) Broker the project: The mayor should start to
bring together the diverse interests in the project and
determine their level of commitment and what they are willing
to do for the project. The mayor, when meeting with these
interests, can start to solicit support for the
recommendations outlined previously.
2) Establish a vision: The mayor needs to communiciate
and visualize his vision for this project and its impact on
the city. At the same time, the mayor needs to tie this
vision into a larger one that encompasses the Cherry Creek
project, the convention center, the Platte Valley, and down-
town housing.
3) Clearly establish this project as a high priority:
The citizenry, the city council, the business community, the
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mayor's administration and the developer, all need to clearly
understand that this project is a high priority of the mayor.
The mayor in turn needs to work with these groups to establish
this project as a high priority for them so as to have their
support throughout the project. The mayor's efforts on the
project need to be visible so that all the groups can see the
importance of the project to the mayor.
CONCLUSION:
These recommendations are designed to guide the Mayor's
decision-making given the current status of the project. They
are not meant to be all inclusive of the many issues that will
face the Mayor in dealing with this and similar projects.
However, it is hoped that they will provide a suitable base
for dealing with the future issues that will arise. It will
be through the leadership exerted by the Mayor that the recom-
mendations can be achieved.
When the public sector becomes involved in real estate
development, there are many more issues that need to be
addressed than those in proviate sector development.
The bottom line in the private sector primarily
involves the profit from the deal. Developers that become
involved in the tedious process of downtown retail development
are usually looking for more than just financial returns
however. In the public sector there are not only different
bottom lines, but there are many more "shareholders" that need
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to be satisfied. The bottom lines for the public sector often
include economic development returns, as well as the returns
that are counted at the polls every 2 or 4 years.
With the absence of federal funds, public sector
participation in development will require a much more
entrepreneurial and potentially riskier approach. In order to
pursue this approach, the public sector will need to exhibit
significant leadership and civic will. The return the public
sector receives for their contribution should not only take
the form of economic development returns but should also take
some form of the cash flow commensurate with their role and
goals in the project.
The City of Denver, through the leadership of the
Mayor, has the opportunity and the ability to stimulate the
revitalization of downtown through public sector participation
in real estate development. The efforts that the city puts
forth in this retail project can be applied to other types of
development in downtown for many years into the future.
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DEnVER = CEnTERSTrE
Project * Centerstone
Location 0 The Denver Centerstone includes two full blocks fronting
on Denver's successful 16th St. Retail Mall between
Tremont and Welton spanning Glenarm Place.
Opening Date * September 1988
Retail * This exciting project is anchored by a 500,000 square
foot urban mall on 4 levels. The glass atrium spans
Glenarm Place opening the stores to the cityscape and
bringing the city to the shopping space. Two major fash-
ion retailers and 100 quality stores, restaurants, theatres
round out the project.
Office Tower * Two 650,000 square foot office towers top the retail
space with over 30 stories each.
Parking * Three levels of parking offering ample retail and office
parking which augments the already abundent parking
near the 16th St. Mall.
Special Features * Denver Centerstone is located on the 16th Street Pedes-
tr Mall which stretches for 13 blocks, the length of
the downtown area. Shuttle vehicles run the full length of
the Mall for the convenience of shoppers and visitors.
The Mall is lined by a myriad of restaurants and a wide
variety of retail establishments.
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Map of DowntownRetail Interior
For leasing contact:
Oxford Properties, Inc.
Republic Plaza
370 17th Street, Suite 3800
Denver, Colorado 80202
(303) 592-5200
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